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14		 Fairness,	Definition	and	the	Legislator’s	Intent:	Arguments	from	Epieikeia	in	Aristotle’s	Rhetoric		 MIKLÓS	KÖNCZÖL	
HAS	Institute,	Pázmány	Péter	Catholic	University,	Hungary	
miklos.konczol@jak.ppke.hu			 The	paper	first	seeks	to	reconstruct,	on	the	basis	of	Aristotle’s	explanation	and	example	in	the	Rhetoric	(1374a	26–b	1),	how	the	 shortcomings	 of	 a	 legal	 text,	 resulting	 from	 an	 omission	made	 by	 the	 legislator,	 can	 be	 plausibly	 argued	 to	 provide	sufficient	 ground	 for	 not	 applying	 the	 rule	 contained	 by	 the	text.	 Second,	 it	 argues	 that	 the	 topics	 of	 fairness	 listed	 by	Aristotle	 (1374b	 2–22)	 cannot	 be	 used	 to	 reconstruct	Aristotle’s	 views	 on	 the	 functioning	 of	 epieikeia	 in	 judicial	decision-making.		 KEYWORDS:	 Aristotle,	 definition,	 Epieikeia,	 fairness,	 justice,	legislator’s	intent,	Rhetoric			1.	INTRODUCTION		In	Aristotle’s	Rhetoric,	Book	I,	Chapter	10,	a	general	classification	of	just	and	unjust	deeds	(1373b	1–6)	 is	 intended	to	serve	as	an	outline	of	the	possible	topics	of	arguments	useful	in	judicial	speeches,	where	the	goal	(telos)	of	rhetoric	is	persuasion	about	lawfulness.	Some	of	these	deeds,	Aristotle	 states	 (1374a	20–26),	 are	 just	 or	 unjust	 (lawful	 or	 unlawful)	according	 to	 unwritten	 laws,	 and	 these	 can	 be	 divided	 in	 two	 groups:	those	resulting	 from	a	high	 level	of	virtue	or	vice,	which	are	regulated	by	 social	 norms	 other	 than	written	 law	 (cf.	 Harris,	 2013a,	 p.	 30),	 and	those	 related	 to	 some	 shortcoming	 (elleimma)	 of	 a	 particular	 written	law.	 In	the	second	case,	however,	 it	should	be	regulated	by	the	written	law	of	 a	 specific	political	 community,	but	 the	 respective	 law	somehow	fails	 to	 provide	 the	 adequate	 rules.	 Fairness	 (to	 epieikes)	 is	 a	 kind	 of	justice	 applicable	 to	 the	 latter	 kind	 of	 situation:	 it	 is	 justice	 beyond	written	law	(to	para	ton	gegrammenon	nomon	dikaion,	1374a	27–28).	The	 interpretation	 of	 Aristotelian	 fairness	 has	 always	 been	 a	favourite	topic	of	legal	philosophers	and	legal	historians	alike.	For	both	groups,	 it	 is	 important	 as	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 strict	 application	 of	 the	
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320	law.	Philosophers	 therefore	mostly	study	 it	as	an	historical	example	of	legal	decisions	being	based	on	moral	considerations	rather	than	positive	law.	For	 legal	historians,	 the	same	problem	appears	as	 the	question	of	whether	 Athenian	 (or	 ancient	 Greek)	 law	 did	 recognise	 grounds	 of	judicial	 decisions	 outside	 of	 written	 law.	While	 both	 approaches	 have	proven	 fruitful	 in	 providing	 new	 insights	 for	 legal	 history	 and	philosophy,	 the	 following	discussion	 looks	at	 fairness	primarily	 from	a	rhetorical	 perspective,	 focusing	 on	 how	 arguments	 from	 fairness	function	in	legal	argumentation.	Starting	from	a	brief	reconstruction	of	the	concept	of	fairness	on	the	basis	of	Book	V,	Chapter	10	of	 the	Nicomachean	Ethics,	 I	 shall	 first	compare	Aristotelian	and	Platonic	fairness.	The	analysis	of	the	relevant	passages	 of	 the	 Rhetoric	 follows	 in	 two	 parts:	 first	 the	 conceptual	summary	 and	 the	 example	 (1374a	 26–b	 1)	 given	 by	 Aristotle	 are	examined	 to	map	 the	 structure	 of	 epieikeia	 arguments,	 then	 the	 links	between	these	arguments	and	the	list	of	epieikeia-related	topics	(1374b	2–22).	 I	 hope	 to	 show	 the	 close	 relationship	between	 arguments	 from	fairness	 and	 arguments	 from	 definition	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	distance	between	the	formal	description	of	fairness	and	the	subsequent	list	of	topics	on	the	other.		2.	FAIRNESS	IN	THE	NICOMACHEAN	ETHICS		In	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics,	 we	 find	 the	 most	 detailed	 discussion	 of	fairness	 in	 Book	 V,	 Chapter	 10	 (1137a	 31–1138a	 3),	 in	 an	 excursus	between	problems	related	to	the	notions	of	“being	treated	unjustly”	and	“acting	unjustly”.	Aristotle	approaches	 the	 topic	 through	the	ambiguity	of	the	usage	of	the	term	epieikes:		[S]ometimes	 we	 praise	 what	 is	 fair	 and	 the	 corresponding	man,	in	such	a	way	that	we	transfer	the	term	to	other	features	we	are	praising,	too,	in	place	of	‘good’	[…]	while	at	other	times	it	 appears	 odd	 […]	 that	 what	 is	 fair	 should	 be	 something	praiseworthy	when	it	 is	something	that	runs	counter	to	what	is	just.	(1137a	35–b	4)1		The	solution	of	the	problem	comes	from	another	ambiguity:	that	of	the	term	 “just”.	 In	 one	 sense,	 “just”	 means	 “legally	 just”,	 and	 it	 is	 in	 this	sense	 that	 epieikeia	 “runs	 counter	 to	what	 is	 just”	 and	 “is	 better	 than	what	is	just	in	one	sense”.	In	a	more	general	sense,	however,	what	is	just																																									 																					1	Quotations	from	the	Nicomachean	Ethics	follow	the	text	of	Rowe’s	translation	(Broadie	&	Rowe,	2002),	with	occasional	modifications.	
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321	comprises	what	is	epieikes	(1137b	8–11).	The	reason	for	the	ambiguity	is	that	while	laws	aim	at	justice	by	their	nature	(see	1129b	14–24),	they	may	 still	 lead	 to	 unjust	 decisions	 in	 individual	 cases	 and	 may	 need	rectification	through	epieikeia:		The	cause	of	this	is	that	all	law	is	universal,	and	yet	there	are	some	 things	about	which	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	make	universal	pronouncements.	 So	 in	 the	 sorts	 of	 cases	 in	 which	 it	necessarily	 pronounces	 universally,	 but	 cannot	 do	 so	 and	achieve	correctness,	law	chooses	what	holds	for	the	most	part,	in	full	knowledge	of	the	error	it	is	making.	(1137b	13–16)			It	 is	 in	 those	cases,	 i.e.	where	a	general	rule	 fails	 to	 take	 the	particular	circumstances	of	a	given	case	into	account,	that	fairness	can	play	a	role	in	the	application	of	law:		 [O]n	 these	occasions	 it	 is	correct,	where	 there	 is	an	omission	by	 the	 lawgiver,	 and	 he	 has	 gone	wrong	 by	 having	made	 an	unqualified	 pronouncement,	 to	 rectify	 the	 deficiency	 by	reference	 to	what	 the	 lawgiver	himself	would	have	said	 if	he	had	 been	 there	 and,	 if	 he	 had	 known	 about	 the	 case,	 would	have	laid	down	in	law.	(1137b	21–24)		Aristotle	 emphasises	 that	 such	 cases	 do	 not	 result	 from	 intellectual	errors	 made	 by	 the	 legislator,	 nor	 do	 they	 indicate	 the	 technical	deficiency	 of	 a	 piece	 of	 legislation.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 inevitable	consequences	of	the	tension	between	the	universality	of	the	law	and	the	singularity	of	human	actions	(see	1137b	17–19).2	A	related,	and	equally	important,	point	he	makes	is	that	 ‘rectification’	does	not	mean	denying	the	 validity	 of	 the	 law,	 but	 has	 to	 be	 made	 with	 reference	 to	 the	legislator’s	intention.	Thus,	 although	 Aristotle	 is	 aware	 that	 legislation	 may	 contain	errors	(see	1129b	24–25),	epieikeia	 is	not	meant	to	correct	that	sort	of	deficiency	by	amending	the	law.3	Its	purpose	is	to	bring	about	justice	in	the	 individual	 case,	 thus	 fulfilling	 the	actual	 intention	of	 the	 legislator.																																									 																					2	 He	 also	 adds	 that	 there	 is	 another	means	 of	 regulation,	 the	 decrees,	 which	allow	for	a	greater	flexibility	on	the	part	of	the	legislator.	As	decrees	are	made	for	 individual	 cases	 rather	 than	 generalised	 types	 of	 behaviour,	 they	 do	 not	have	to	provide	rules	for	an	infinite	number	of	cases.	See	1137b	27–32.	3	 Pace	 Hurri	 (2013,	 p.	 154).	 Cf.	 also	 Saunders	 (2001,	 p.	 80;	 ibid.	 n.	 29),	mentioning	 the	 possibility	 of	 “a	 piecemeal	 modification”,	 with	 reference	 to	Brunschwig	 (1980,	 pp.	 525–526).	 See	 further	Mirhady	 (1990,	 p.	 395)	 on	 the	judges	acting	as	legislators.	
Miklós	Könczöl		
	
322	Consequently,	it	works	through	the	interpretation	of	the	law	rather	than	against	the	law	(see	Brunschwig	1996,	p.	140;	Harris,	2013a,	p.	28).		3.	EPIEIKEIA	IN	PLATO		Aristotle’s	 observation	 that	 legal	 regulation	 in	 itself	 cannot	 provide	adequate	 grounds	 for	 decision	 in	 each	 particular	 case	 is	 strikingly	similar	to	what	the	Stranger	says	in	Plato’s	Statesman:		 [L]aw	could	never	accurately	embrace	what	 is	best	and	most	just	for	all	at	the	same	time,	and	so	prescribe	what	is	best;	for	the	 dissimilarities	 between	 human	 beings	 and	 their	 actions,	and	 the	 fact	 that	 practically	 nothing	 in	 human	 affairs	 ever	remains	stable,	prevent	any	kind	of	expertise	whatsoever	from	making	any	simple	decision	in	any	sphere	that	covers	all	cases	and	 will	 last	 for	 all	 time.	 […]	 But	 we	 see	 law	 bending	 itself	more	or	less	towards	this	very	thing,	like	some	self-willed	and	ignorant	person,	who	allows	no	one	to	do	anything	contrary	to	what	he	orders,	nor	to	ask	any	questions,	not	even	if	after	all	something	 new	 turns	 out	 for	 someone	 which	 is	 better,	contrary	 to	 the	prescription	which	he	himself	has	 laid	down.	(294a	10–c	4)4		In	 the	 Statesman,	 the	 conclusion	 is	 not	 formulated	with	 regard	 to	 the	judge	but	to	the	legislator,	 i.e.	the	ruler	of	the	state.	Laws,	 imperfect	as	they	are,	serve	as	general	instructions	for	cases	where	the	ruler	cannot	make	a	decision	himself.	 In	 those	cases,	however,	where	he	 is	present,	he	 must	 be	 allowed	 to	 overrule	 these	 general	 instructions,	 for	 his	personal	 expertise	 and	 ability	 to	 consider	 all	 the	 circumstances	 will	probably	lead	to	better	decisions	than	the	legal	rule	would	in	itself.	It	 is	 only	 in	 the	 Laws	 that	 Plato	 addresses	 the	 same	 problem	with	 reference	 to	 the	 application	 of	 law,	 apparently	 accepting	 the	 fact	that	 the	 legislator	 cannot	 be	 present	 everywhere	 to	 adjudicate	 legal	disputes,	and	that	 therefore	 judges	need	to	be	authorised	to	exercise	a	certain	level	of	discretion.	What	exactly	this	level	should	be	depends	on	the	 skills	 of	 the	 judges	 concerned.	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	 facts	 is	necessarily	subject	to	judicial	deliberation,	for	the	facts	of	the	individual	case	 cannot	 be	 legislated	 upon	 in	 advance.	 Yet	 the	 Athenian	 speaker	seems	 to	 be	 quite	 confident	 that	 in	 Magnesia,	 the	 city	 to	 be	 founded	along	 the	 lines	 set	 by	 the	 dialogue,	 there	 will	 be	 a	 citizenry	 that	 can	provide	 competent	 judges	 who	 can	 be	 left	 to	 decide	 some	 other																																									 																					4	Translated	by	Rowe	(1995).	
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323	questions	as	well.	Concerning	penalties,	for	example,	the	Athenian	says	that	 	the	 judge	must	 assist	 the	 lawgiver	 in	 carrying	 out	 this	 same	task,	whenever	the	law	entrusts	to	him	the	assessment	of	what	the	 defendant	 is	 to	 suffer	 or	 pay,	 while	 the	 lawgiver,	 like	 a	draughtsman,	 must	 give	 a	 sketch	 in	 outline	 of	 cases	 which	illustrate	the	rules	of	the	written	code.	(934b	6–c	2)	5		The	 sketch	 that	 follows	 is,	 however,	 a	 fairly	 detailed	 one:	 Plato	apparently	 seeks	 to	 eliminate	 from	Magnesian	 legislation	much	 of	 the	ambiguity	 present	 in	 its	 Athenian	 counterpart	 (see	 Harris,	 2013b,	 pp.	205–209).6	But	 can	 judges	 in	Magnesia	 go	 beyond	written	 law	 in	 order	 to	reach	 a	 more	 just	 verdict?	 It	 seems	 that	 there	 is	 at	 least	 one	 type	 of	affairs	where	they	can.	One	of	the	Magnesian	laws	provides	that	in	case	a	 father	 dies	 having	 a	 daughter	 but	 no	 (natural	 or	 adopted)	 son,	 the	male	 relative	who	 comes	 next	 in	 the	 order	 defined	 by	 the	 law	 has	 to	marry	 the	 daughter	 (924e	 3–925a	 2).	 The	 legislator,	 however,	 has	 to	take	into	account	the	possibility	that	the	prospective	heir	cannot	marry	the	 daughter	 because	 of	 her	 physical	 or	 mental	 illness	 (925d	 5–e	 5,	926b	2–6).	Such	cases	have	to	be	adjudicated	by	a	panel	of	arbitrators	(diaitētai)	who	are	allowed	to	grant	exemption	from	the	legal	obligation	(926a	6–7,	b	7–d	2).	Arguably,	this	is	a	case	of	epieikeia,	albeit	Plato	does	not	use	the	term	for	it.7	We	see	the	tension	between	the	law	formulated	in	universal	terms	 and	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 individual	 case	 (925d	 8–e	 2);	 the	preamble	 to	 the	 law	 asks	 for	 understanding	 (syngnōmē)	 on	 behalf	 of	both	the	legislator	(for	his	inability	to	consider	individual	cases)	and	the	persons	asking	for	exemption	(for	their	 inability	to	obey	the	command	of	the	law)	(925e	6–926	a	3);	and	in	the	procedure	reference	has	to	be	made	to	the	legislator’s	intent	(926c	2–4).	This	makes	clear	that	fairness	is	not	directed	against	the	validity	of	the	law	and	that	it	actually	serves																																									 																					5	Translated	by	Saunders	(1970).	6	Cf.	also	the	remark	made	by	Saunders	(2001,	p.	87):	“Not	only	will	the	gaps	be	fewer,	 but	 the	 actual	 laws	 will	 be	 far	 less	 open-ended	 conceptually;	 for	 the	Magnesian	 citizen	 is	 conditioned	 not	 merely	 by	 an	 intensive	 educational	process	but	by	the	frequent	legal	preambles:	he	will	have	fairly	firm	ideas	about	what	(say)	justice,	virtue,	heresy,	good	and	bad	artistic	standards,	really	are”.	7	 See	 Saunders	 (2001,	 pp.	 84–86),	 with	 some	 qualifications	 based	 on	 certain	differences	between	the	typical	form	of	epieikeia	and	Plato’s	description	of	the	situation.	
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324	the	good	of	the	political	community	better	than	a	strict	enforcement	of	the	general	rule.	What	makes	this	kind	of	fairness	interesting	(and	characteristic	of	Plato’s	Magnesia)	is	that,	as	Trevor	Saunders	put	it,		 the	 need	 for	 it	 is	 recognised,	 but	 only	 in	 rare	 and	 extreme	cases;	and	its	operation	is	taken	clean	out	of	private	hands	and	transferred	 to	 senior	 officials	who	 act	 on	 criteria	 subserving	the	public	interest.	[…]	To	put	the	point	in	a	lapidary	manner,	Plato	has	nationalised	a	private	virtue.	(Saunders,	2001,	p.	92)		This	is	essentially	the	same	as	what	happens	to	rhetoric	in	Magnesia:	it	is	 taken	 over	 by	 the	 legislator	 and	 subordinated	 to	 the	 interest	 of	 the	state.8		4.	FAIRNESS	AND	DEFINITION	IN	THE	RHETORIC:	AN	EXAMPLE		Coming	back	to	Aristotle,	we	may	now	see	how	the	very	fact	of	including	the	discussion	of	epieikeia	 signals	an	 important	departure	 from	Plato’s	doctrine.	Unlike	 in	 the	Nicomachean	 Ethics,	 where	 he	 speaks	 about	 the	legislator’s	 awareness	 of	 the	 problems	 caused	 by	 the	 inevitable	generality	 of	 legislation,	 in	 the	 Rhetoric	 Aristotle	 mentions	 two	possibilities	(cf.	Kraut,	2002,	p.	108,	n.	17):	shortcomings	in	written	law	may	be	either	due	to	the	ignorance	of	the	legislator,	or	on	the	contrary,	brought	about	by	him	through	the	deliberate	use	of	general	 terms	and	the	 lack	of	distinctions.	He	 then	gives	an	example	 for	 the	collision	of	a	strict	 interpretation	 of	 written	 law	 and	 fairness,	 resulting	 from	 the	inevitable	 lack	 of	 complete	 conceptual	 determination	 in	 normative	texts:	 	In	many	cases	it	is	not	easy	to	define	the	limitless	possibilities,	for	example	how	long	and	what	sort	of	iron	has	to	be	used	to	constitute	 ‘wounding’,	 for	 a	 lifetime	 would	 not	 suffice	 to																																									 																					8	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	 this	kind	of	epieikeia	 does	not	 serve	 justice	directly.	The	aim	of	the	legislator	is,	rather,	to	avoid	enforcing	the	law	in	cases	where	its	addressees	 would	 prefer	 to	 suffer	 punishment,	 as	 the	 law	 cannot	 fulfil	 its	function	 of	 guiding	 human	 actions	 in	 those	 cases,	 and	 even	 if	 they	 obeyed	would	 not	 serve	 the	 public	 interest.	 It	 could	 be	 argued,	 however,	 that	 the	exception	serves	 justice	 indirectly,	 as	 it	would	be	unjust	 to	punish	 those	who	decline	to	obey	the	law	only	because	obeying	it	would	be	worse	than	suffering	whatever	 punishment	 (cf.	 925e	 2–5),	 which	 amounts	 to	 some	 kind	 of	 a	necessity	(cf.	926a	2–3).	
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325	enumerate	 the	possibilities.	 If,	 then,	 the	action	 is	undefinable	when	a	law	must	be	framed,	it	is	necessary	to	speak	in	general	terms,	 so	 that	 if	 someone	wearing	a	 ring	 raises	his	hand	and	strikes,	 by	 the	 written	 law	 he	 is	 violating	 the	 law	 and	 does	wrong,	 when	 in	 truth	 he	 has	 not	 done	 any	 harm	 and	 this	(judgement)	is	fair.	(1374a	31–b	1)9		 In	the	introductory	chapter	of	the	Rhetoric,	Aristotle	has	already	pointed	 out	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 legislator’s	 competence	 in	 terms	 of	questions	 of	 fact	 (1354b	 11–16).	 Here,	 however,	 he	 goes	 one	 step	further,	asserting	that	even	if	the	legislator	has	got	a	definite	intent	(in	the	example	it	may	be	that	people	should	refrain	from	assaulting	others	with	weapons	made	of	iron),	its	formulation	as	it	appears	in	the	written	text	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 imperfect.	 Therefore,	 the	 argument	 can	 be	 made	before	the	court	that	in	addition	to	applying	the	rule	previously	given	to	the	 particular	 facts	 of	 the	 case,	 the	 judges	 also	 have	 to	 establish	what	provisions	 the	 text	 of	 the	 law	 actually	 contains.	 The	 result	 of	 their	examination	of	the	rule	may	contradict	what	is	generally	understood	to	be	 the	 ‘ordinary	meaning’	 of	 the	 text.	 Of	 course,	 the	 speaker	 need	not	highlight	that	this	is	what	happens	in	the	court:	rather,	he	may	propose	a	reading	of	 the	 text	as	 the	one	 that	genuinely	reflects	 the	 intention	of	the	legislator.	Arguments	from	the	legislator’s	intent	have	a	twofold	character.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	 exemplify	 what	 are	 often	 termed	 ‘teleological’	arguments.10	As	Jacques	Brunschwig	puts	it	in	his	interpretation,		 there	exists	a	perfectly	applicable	law,	but	[…]	a	mechanical	or	blind	 application	 of	 it	 would	 be	 too	 severe	 according	 to	 the	moral	intuitions	of	the	judge	and	those	of	the	society	in	which	he	works.	(Brunschwig,	1996,	p.	139,	following	Shiner,	1987)		Consequently,	the	argument	is	based	on	the	assertion	that	the	legislator	would	not	have	intended	the	law	to	lead	to	such	a	verdict.	On	the	other	hand,	the	legislator’s	intent	is	still	something	referred	to	in	“rule-based	reasoning”,	 where	 it	 appears	 as	 a	 means	 of	 interpretation,	 which	 is	intended	 to	 help	 establish	 the	 meaning	 of	 a	 normative	 text,	 by	explaining	 how	 the	 legislator	 actually	 meant	 what	 he	 put	 into	 words.	What	is	important	for	us	to	see	here	is	that	this	method	of	reasoning,	i.e.																																									 																					9	Quotations	from	the	Rhetoric	follow	the	revised	text	of	Kennedy’s	translation	(Kennedy,	2007),	with	occasional	modifications.	10	 The	 consequentialist	 nature	 of	 teleological	 interpretation	 is	 highlighted	 by	Cserne	(2011,	p.	38).	
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326	advocating	fairness	by	way	of	interpreting	the	text,	makes	it	possible	for	the	orator	to	avoid	questioning	the	authority	of	written	law.	We	 have	 seen	 that	 in	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics	 Aristotle	emphasises	 the	 link	 between	 the	 “correction”	 of	 the	 law	 and	 the	legislator’s	 intention	 (which	 also	 appears	 among	 the	 topics	 of	 fairness	listed	 later	 in	 the	 Rhetoric).	 The	 problem	 here	 is,	 apparently,	 that	whatever	 one	 thinks	 about	 the	 legislator’s	 writing	 skills,	 the	 most	obvious	way	of	knowing	his	intention	is	still	to	read	the	text	of	the	law.	Thus,	arguments	for	a	not-so-ordinary	meaning	of	the	text	have	to	face	a	good	deal	of	scepticism.	This	kind	of	scepticism	is	well	 illustrated	by	a	quotation	 from	L.	L.	Fuller’s	 fictitious	Case	of	 the	Speluncean	Explorers,	in	which	a	judge	says	that		[t]he	process	of	 judicial	reform	requires	three	steps.	The	first	of	 these	 is	 to	divine	 some	single	 “purpose”	which	 the	 statute	serves.	This	is	done	although	not	one	statute	in	a	hundred	has	any	such	single	purpose,	and	although	the	objectives	of	nearly	every	 statute	 are	 differently	 interpreted	 by	 the	 different	classes	 of	 its	 sponsors.	 The	 second	 step	 is	 to	 discover	 that	 a	mythical	 being	 called	 “the	 legislator,”	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 this	imagined	“purpose,”	overlooked	something	or	left	some	gap	or	imperfection	 in	 his	 work.	 Then	 comes	 the	 final	 and	 most	refreshing	 part	 of	 the	 task,	 which	 is,	 of	 course,	 to	 fill	 in	 the	blank	 thus	 created.	 Quod	 erat	 faciendum.	 (Fuller,	 1949,	 p.	364)11		What,	then,	remains	of	epieikeia	for	arguments	that	can	be	safely	used	in	a	speech	without	appearing	to	be	seeking	“to	be	wiser	than	the	laws”	–	to	use	 the	words	of	Aristotle	(1375b	23–24)?	 It	may	be	a	good	 idea	 to	come	 back	 to	 the	 example	 Aristotle	 gives	 for	 using	 fairness	 in	 a	particular	case	of	judging	an	offence.	“[I]f	someone	wearing	a	ring	raises	his	hand	or	strikes,	by	the	written	law	he	is	violating	the	law	and	does	wrong.”	Here	 the	discrepancy	between	 the	 law	and	 the	 truth	 is	due	 to	the	fact	that	the	law	does	not	define	“how	long	and	what	sort	of	iron	has	to	 be	 used	 to	 constitute	 ‘wounding’.”	 The	 law,	 as	 far	 as	 it	 can	 be	reconstructed	from	Aristotle’s	words,	forbids	and	punishes	assault	with	iron.	 In	 case	 someone	 strikes	 another	 person	with	 an	 iron	 ring	 on	his	hand,	the	conceptual	requirements	for	applying	the	law	obtain	and	the																																									 																					11	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	in	Athenian	legal	discourse	the	legislator	is	never	 regarded	 as	 a	 “mythical	 being,”	 although	 the	 historical	 identity	 of	legislators	 is	not	examined	either.	References	to	the	legislator	are	rather	used	to	attribute	a	single	 intention	to	the	 law	of	 the	polis,	cf.	Harris	(2000,	pp.	50–51).	
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327	action	qualifies	as	“wounding”.	In	such	a	case,	applying	the	sanctions	of	wounding	would	 lead	 to	 injustice,	 as	 it	would	mean	 treating	 different	actions	(e.g.	deliberately	using	a	sword	and	wearing	a	ring)	in	the	same	way.	 This	 is,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics,	 an	 error	 that	results	from	the	lacking	qualification	(cf.	1137b	22).	In	 such	 a	 case,	 the	 defendant	 can	 suggest	 that	 further	qualification	has	to	be	added	by	the	 judges,	saying	“what	the	 legislator	would	 have	 included.”	 For	 example,	 further	 details	 concerning	 the	characteristics	of	 the	object	made	of	 iron	can	be	described,	 in	order	 to	make	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 ring	 and	 a	 weapon	 appear	 in	 the	judgement.	Or	the	intention	of	the	person	“raising	his	hand	or	striking”	can	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration,	 in	 order	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	deliberate	use	of	a	weapon	and	wearing	a	ring	on	one’s	hand—“looking	not	to	the	action	but	to	the	deliberate	purpose,”	as	Aristotle	puts	it	later	(1374b	13–14).	These	qualifications	would	then	concern	the	concept	of	‘wounding’	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 law.	 The	 defendant	would	 argue	 that	 he	“raised	his	hand”	or	“stroke”	but	did	not	“wound,”	denying	not	the	fact	itself	but	its	legal	qualification.	This	way	of	reasoning	would	then	be	strikingly	similar	to	what	is	described	 in	 Chapter	 13	 in	 the	 paragraphs	 immediately	 preceding	 the	discussion	 of	 fairness.	 Arguments	 from	 fairness	 as	 well	 as	 those	concerning	 the	 epigramma	 focus	 on	 the	moment	 of	 decision,	which	 is	essentially	 about	 the	 correspondence	between	 the	description	of	what	happened	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	abstract	case	contained	by	the	legal	rule	 on	 the	 other.12	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 question	 in	 both	 cases	 is	 if	 a	certain	 rule	 is	 relevant	 for	 a	 certain	 human	 action.	 Looking	 for	 the	difference	 between	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 argument,	 we	 find	 Aristotle	referring	to	epigramma	as	“what	the	laws	regulate”	(1374a	19–20)	and	to	epieikeia	as	related	to	unwritten	law	(20–26).	Thus,	in	the	case	of	the	former	 the	 speaker	 concentrates	 on	 how	 the	 individual	 action	 can	 be	best	described	with	 the	 legal	 terms	given	 in	 the	 law.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	latter,	 in	 turn,	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 how	 the	 legal	 provision	 should	 be	(re)formulated	 to	 express	 the	 legislator’s	 (presumable)	 intention.	 In	light	of	that,	Aristotle’s	advice	about	having	definitions	at	hand	(1374a	6–9)	may	equally	refer	to	those	arguing	from	fairness.		5.	TOPICS	OF	FAIRNESS		Interpreters	 rightly	 note	 that	 Aristotle’s	 discussions	 of	 epieikeia	comprise	two	different	perspectives:	one	that	focuses	on	the	corrective																																									 																					12	 Cf.	 the	 distinction	 between	 Sachverhalt	 and	 (gesetzlicher)	 Tatbestand	 in	German	legal	doctrine	(Rechtsdogmatik),	see	e.g.	Larenz	(1969,	pp.	230–233).	
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328	function	 of	 epieikeia	 and	 one	 looking	 at	 epieikeia	 as	 a	 virtue	 (see	 e.g.	Rapp,	2002,	p.	503).	This	distinction	is	very	important	because	it	is	only	by	 keeping	 these	 perspectives	 separate	 that	 one	 can	 account	 for	 the	difference	between	the	theoretical	reconstruction	of	epieikeia	at	1374a	26–1374b	1	and	the	list	of	related	topics	at	1374b	2–22.	While	it	is	not	very	difficult	 to	 see	how	epieikeia	 as	 a	way	of	 statutory	 interpretation	can	 help	 the	 speaker	 persuade	 the	 judges	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 to	contribute	 to	 a	 just	 decision	 on	 the	 other,	 the	 topics	 of	 fairness,	 or	 at	least	some	of	them,	seem	much	more	puzzling.	The	 sentence	 that	 introduces	 the	 list	 of	 topics	 (1374b	 2–3)	 by	establishing	 a	 link	with	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 of	 to	 epieikes	 makes	clear,	at	any	rate,	 that	 the	 following	 list	 shows	characteristic	examples	of	fair	and	unfair	actions	and	persons.		
5.1	Understanding		The	 actual	 list	 of	 examples	 begins	 with	 having	 understanding	(syngnōmē).13	Syngnōmē	 appears	 in	Book	VI	of	 the	Nicomachean	Ethics	as	a	capacity	related	to	deciding	about	what	is	epieikes	(1143a	19–24).	While	 it	 is	 sometimes	 interpreted	 as	 some	 kind	 of	 an	 extra-legal	consideration	based	on	empathy	alone	(see,	however,	Grimaldi,	1980,	p.	302),	 in	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics	 Aristotle	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 it	 is	directed	at	truth,	which	is	also	emphasised	at	the	end	of	the	example	in	the	 Rhetoric,	 where	 to	 alēthes	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	 gegrammenos	 nomos	(1374a	 36–b	 1).	 The	 framing14	 of	 the	 following	 distinctions	 between	errors	 (hamartēmata)	 and	 wrongs	 (adikēmata),	 and	 errors	 and																																									 																					13	The	opening	phrase	of	the	list,	eph’	hois	te	gar	dei	syngnōmēn	echein,	epieikē	
tauta,	 raises	problems	 in	 terms	of	 rendering	 as	well.	Kennedy	 (2007,	 p.	 100)	takes	tauta	to	refer	to	eph’	hois,	and	hois	to	be	the	indirect	subject	of	syngnōmēn	
echein,	 which	 results	 in	 the	 translation	 “those	 actions	 that	 [another	 person]	should	 pardon	 are	 fair.”	 The	 reason	why	 one	 should	 pardon	 anything	 that	 is	
epieikes	 is	 not	 quite	 clear,	 however.	 The	 subsequent	 phrases	 (about	distinguishing	between	hamartēmata,	 atychēmata,	 and	adikēmata,	 see	below)	suggest	that	it	is	syngnōmēn	echein	that	is	to	be	considered	as	epieikes,	and	its	indirect	 subject	 eph’	 hois	 […]	 dei:	 “it	 is	 fair	 to	 pardon	 what	 should	 be	[pardoned].”	The	plural	form	tauta,	instead	of	touto,	may	be	explained	either	by	the	multiplicity	of	the	situations	where	syngnōmē	is	needed,	or	by	the	instances	of	epieikeia	 that	follow.	Grimaldi	(1980,	p.	302)	rightly	sees	syngnōmēn	echein	as	an	instance	of	the	epieikē,	but	fails	to	give	a	satisfactory	explanation	for	his	interpretation.	14	The	section	on	syngnōmē	seems	to	be	finished	by	“to	be	forgiving	of	human	weakness	is	fair”	(1374b	10–11).	
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329	misfortune	 (atychēmata),	 respectively,	 suggests	 that	 making	 such	distinctions	belongs	to	the	domain	of	syngnōmē.	Aristotle	gives	exact	criteria	 for	each	of	 the	 three	cases	(1374b	6–10).	Misfortune,	he	says,	cannot	be	anticipated	by	reason	(paraloga)	and	 is	 not	 caused	 by	 an	 evil	 moral	 disposition	 (mē	 apo	 mochthērias).	Errors,	 in	turn,	can	be	anticipated	(mē	paraloga)	but	do	not	stem	from	moral	badness	either	(mē	apo	ponērias).	It	is	only	wrongdoing	that	can	be	anticipated	by	reason	and	result	from	an	evil	moral	disposition,	from	which	 wrongs	 committed	 because	 of	 desire	 (di’	 epithymian)	 are	 no	exception.	Apparently,	 then,	 it	 is	 only	 the	 wrongs	 that	 deserve	 the	 full	rigour	 of	 the	 law,	while	 errors	 and	misfortune	 call	 for	 a	more	 lenient	treatment.	While	Aristotle	gives	no	examples	here,	his	 criteria	make	 it	quite	clear	what	cases	belong	to	each	of	 these	categories.	Wrongdoing,	which	has	been	defined	at	the	beginning	of	Chapter	10	(1368b	6–7	and	9–10),	is	the	case	the	legislator	has	in	mind	when	drafting	a	law	about	a	certain	crime.	Compared	to	that,	an	adequate	adjudication	of	errors	and	misfortune	may	 require	 some	 additions	 to	 the	 legal	 definition	 of	 the	crime,	just	as	described	under	the	heading	of	fairness.	In	the	case	of	misfortune,	 the	wrongful	 intention	on	the	part	of	the	 person	 committing	 the	 crime	 is	 missing	 altogether.	 The	paradigmatic	case	of	that	is	the	harm	caused	by	a	natural	disaster,	as	e.g.	in	the	case	of	a	storm	that	prevents	a	ship	from	reaching	a	port.15	Errors,	on	the	other	hand,	belong	to	the	actions	done	“willingly”	(hekōn),	i.e.	“knowingly	and	unforced”	(cf.	1368b	9–11).	These	cases	are	usually	regarded	as	the	class	of	human	actions	covered	by	“negligence”	in	 modern	 Western	 legal	 terminology	 (see	 Hamburger,	 1971,	 p.	 102;	Harris,	2013a,	p.	32).		
5.2	Letter	and	intent		The	next	topics	of	epieikeia	oppose	the	letter	of	the	law	and	the	intent	of	the	legislator	(1374b	11–13).	As	opposed	to	syngnōmē,	where	the	focus	was	 on	 the	 perpetrator’s	 attitude,	 these	 topics	 focus	 on	 the	 desirable	way	of	statutory	interpretation	(cf.	Harris,	2013a,	p.	32).	Looking	at	the	legislator’s	 intent	 is,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 essential	 for	 building	 up	 an	argument	 from	 fairness,	 at	 least	 if	 one	 wants	 to	 avoid	 making	 the	impression	of	urging	a	decision	contra	legem.		
																																									 																					15	 For	 examples	 of	 trierarchs	 being	 acquitted,	 most	 probably	 due	 to	 their	excuses	of	force	majeure,	see	Harris	(2013a,	pp.	44–45).	
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5.3	Intention		After	 the	opposition	of	 letter	 and	 intent,	 further	 topics	 concerning	 the	perpetrator	 follow.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 regards	 deliberate	 choice	(prohairesis)	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 action	 itself	 (1374b	 13–14),	 thus	continuing	 the	 considerations	 related	 to	 syngnōmē.	On	 the	other	hand,	this	 topic	 seems	 to	 respond	 to	 that	 of	 definition,	where	 Aristotle	 says	that	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 an	 action	 qualifies	 as	 a	 certain	 crime	should	be	decided	on	the	basis	of	prohairesis	 (1374a	11–13).	A	further	link	 is	 to	 Chapters	 10–12,	 where	 the	 probabilities	 are	 related	 to	intention	rather	than	an	action	being	actually	committed.		
5.4	Part	and	whole		The	next	two	topics	oppose	the	part	and	the	whole,	first	in	the	abstract,	then	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 perpetrator’s	 behaviour.	 The	 former	 is,	 in	 itself,	sufficiently	general	to	be	regarded	as	another	formulation	of	the	essence	of	epieikeia,	i.e.	the	requirement	of	achieving	a	decision	that	is	adequate	to	 the	 individual	 case.	 The	 second	 one,	 however,	 may	 seem	 more	problematic,	 as	 it	 seems	 to	 call	 for	 a	 decision	 based	 on	 past	 events	rather	than	on	the	action	under	dispute.16	While	this	possibility	cannot	be	excluded,	there	are	other	possible	explanations	which	come	closer	to	what	seems	to	be	the	basic	principle	of	epieikeia.	First,	past	events	may	be	considered,	if	not	for	deciding	about	the	lawfulness	of	an	action,	then	for	imposing	a	penalty.17	Such	a	reading	would	also	highlight	a	possible	Platonic	 influence.18	 Second,	 the	 general	 behaviour	 of	 the	 defendant	may	be	used	as	indirect	proof	for	his	moral	character	and,	consequently,	his	prohairesis	in	the	specific	case	(cf.	Saunders,	1991,	p.	113;	Johnstone,	1999,	 pp.	 95–97;	 Lanni,	 2006,	 60–61).	 Third,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 that	
																																								 																					16	References	to	past	deeds	do	occur	in	oratory.	An	example	may	be	mentioning	public	 service,	 which	 is	 rejected	 as	 irrelevant	 e.g.	 by	 Lysias	 12.38.	 Cf.	 Harris	(2013b,	pp.	127–128),	pointing	out	also	that	courts	may	not	have	paid	attention	to	 such	 arguments	 (with	 examples	 from	 Aeschines	 3.195,	 Dinarchus	 1.14,	Demosthenes	21.143–147,	19.273	and	277,	24.133–134).	17	See	e.g.	Dinarchus,	Against	Philocles	11.	Cf.	Saunders	(1991,	pp.	113–118)	and	Lanni	(2006,	p.	62).	Harris	(2013b,	pp.	131–136)	points	out	that	in	the	timēsis	the	scope	of	relevant	information	was	broader	than	in	the	first	part	of	the	trial,	where	the	judges	had	to	decide	the	question	of	guilt.	18	 Cf.	 e.g.	 Laws	 862c	 6–e	 2,	 where	 the	 Athenian	 speaker	 explains	 that	punishments	 should	 differ	 according	 to	 whether	 the	 perpetrator	 can	 be	“healed”	or	not.	
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331	these	 topics	 are	 not	 only	 meant	 to	 be	 used	 in	 connection	 with	 the	judges’	decision	but	also	for	displaying	fairness	within	a	speech.19		
5.5	Memories		There	 are	 two	 further	 topics	 that	 concentrate	 explicitly	 on	 past	 deeds	(1374b	 16–18).	 The	 first	 one	 opposes	 good	 things	 to	 bad	 things	experienced	by	the	same	person,	and	the	second	one	good	things	done	by	 someone	 to	 good	 things	 done	 to	 the	 same	person.	Here	 again,	 it	 is	hard	 to	 see	 how	 these	 could	 contribute	 to	 persuasion	 concerning	 the	lawfulness	of	a	specific	action.	Moreover,	unlike	 in	the	previous	topics,	the	opposition	is	not	between	one’s	general	character	and	an	individual	action	 but	 between	 (perhaps	 several)	 particular	 actions,	 and	 the	emphasis	 is	 not	 on	 the	 actions	 themselves	 but	 on	 the	 act	 of	
mnēmoneuein.	Therefore,	the	second	option	of	interpretation	mentioned	above	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 topics	 of	 “part	 and	 whole”	 is	 out	 of	question.	 It	 seems	more	 likely	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	 judges	who	 remember	something	but	someone	of	the	other	participants	of	the	legal	procedure,	and	 that	 mnēmoneuein	 is	 used	 here	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 mentioning	something.		
5.6	Attitudes	to	wrongdoing	and	litigation		In	the	case	of	the	last	three	topics	(1374b	18–22)	there	is	no	doubt	that	they	 do	 not	 regard	 the	 judges’	 attitudes	 but	 those	 of	 the	 litigants	 (or	someone	who	is	not	directly	involved	in	the	case	but	is	characterised	in	the	speech).	They	say	that	 fairness	requires	patience,	and	that	 it	 is	 fair	to	 prefer	 settling	 a	 dispute	 through	words	 to	 doing	 so	 through	 deeds.	The	 former	 may	 be	 regarded	 as	 an	 echo	 of	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics,	1138a	 1–2,	 although	 the	 three	 topics	 in	 the	 Rhetoric	 follow	 an	 order	from	the	most	general	to	the	most	specific,	and	being	patient	does	not	in	itself	contain	any	reference	to	litigation.	The	 opposition	 of	 words	 and	 deeds	 is	 widespread	 in	 Greek	literature	and	the	variety	of	contexts	in	which	it	appears	does	not	allow	for	attributing	one	single	meaning	to	it.	What	seems	the	most	likely	here	is	that,	as	mentioned	above,	the	three	topics	start	with	a	general	attitude	(patience)	 and	 finish	with	 the	 choice	 between	 arbitration	 and	 judicial	decision-making.	 Hence,	 one	may	 reconstruct	 the	 three	 steps	 as	 three	choices	between	 (1)	being	patient	and	 trying	 to	 retaliate;	 (2)	 trying	 to																																									 																					19	A	striking	parallel	for	this	usage	of	epieikeia	can	be	found	in	the	treatise	On	
types	 of	 style	 (Peri	 ideōn,	 2.6)	 attributed	 to	 the	 2nd-century	 (AD)	 rhetorician	Hermogenes	of	Tarsus.	For	an	English	translation	see	Wooten	(1987).	
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332	settle	the	dispute	through	arguments	(which	includes	the	possibility	of	a	legal	 debate)	 and	 physical	 retaliation;	 (3)	 settling	 the	 dispute	 through	arbitration	and	taking	the	issue	to	court.	The	 third	 topic	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 brief	 explanation	concerning	the	nature	of	arbitration,	according	to	which	its	raison	d’être	is	 that	 unlike	 judges,	 arbitrators	 base	 their	 decisions	 upon	 fairness	rather	 than	 the	 laws.	While	 this	 opposition	may	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	courts	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 take	 to	 epieikes	 into	 consideration,	 which	would	 contradict	 both	 what	 Aristotle	 says	 in	 the	 Rhetoric	 and	 the	
Nicomachean	Ethics,20	and	contemporary	judicial	practice	(see	Roebuck,	2001,	p.	182;	Harris,	2013a,	p.	34;	pace	Meyer-Laurin,	1961,	p.	41),	it	is	in	fact	the	arbitrators	who	are	in	the	focus	here	and	Aristotle	seems	to	mean	 only	 that	 they	 do	 not	 have	 to	 provide	 an	 explanation	 that	 is	supported	(exclusively)	by	an	interpretation	of	the	written	law.21		6.	CONCLUSION		Having	 accepted	 an	 argument	 from	 fairness,	 the	 judges	 have	 to	“supplement”	 the	 text	 of	 the	 law	 interpreted,	 thereby	 making	 it	irrelevant	 for	 judging	 the	 action	 under	 dispute.	 The	 intention	 of	 the	legislator	 is	 thus	 referred	 to	 in	order	 to	make	 it	 clear	 that	 it	would	be	contrary	to	this	intention	to	punish	the	defendant	for	having	committed	the	crime	he	is	charged	with	(cf.	Harris,	2013a,	p.	31).	In	this	sense,	we	may	agree	with	 Jacques	Brunschwig,	who	argues	 that	 the	phrase	used	by	 Aristotle	 in	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics	 (“what	 the	 lawgiver	 would	himself	have	said	had	he	been	present,	and	would	have	included	within	the	 law,	had	he	known”)	 refers	 to	 two	different	 things.	 Supplementing	the	text	by	adding	further	qualification	of	the	action	in	terms	of	facts	or	intention	is	done	by	reconstructing	the	abstract	and	general	will	of	the	legislator,	while	deciding	that	the	rule	thus	obtained	is	not	relevant	for	the	facts	of	the	case	is	“what	the	lawgiver	would	himself	have	said	had	he	been	present.”	Yet	these	are	two	consecutive	steps	of	the	same	line	of	reasoning:	 the	 teleological	 or	 consequentialist	 part	 of	 the	 argument,	which	leads	to	the	decision	not	to	apply	the	law	needs	the	backing	of	the																																									 																					20	See	Nicomachian	Ethics	1132a	4–32,	where	Aristotle	describes	 the	 judge	as	
dichastēs,	 i.e.	who	 establishes	 the	 just	mean	 (cf.	Mirhady,	 2006,	 p.	 2;	 see	 also	Harris,	2013a,	p.	32,	n.	20).	21	On	the	general	character	of	arbitration	see	Meyer-Laurin	(1961,	pp.	41–45)	and	 the	 survey	 of	 Roebuck	 (2001).	 On	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 judge	(dikastēs)	and	the	arbitrator	(diaitētēs),	both	Meyer-Laurin	(1961,	p.	37,	n.	130)	and	Mirhady	 (2006,	pp.	2–3)	quote	Aristotle’s	 criticism	of	Hippodamus’	 ideas	concerning	the	ideal	constitution	(Politics	1268b	4–13).	
Fairness,	definition	and	the	legislator’s	intent	
	
	
333	interpretive	or	rule-based	part,	in	order	to	make	the	judges	feel	safe	in	deciding	the	case,	apparently	“according	to	the	laws	and	decrees	of	the	Athenian	 people.”	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Aristotle’s	 final	 clause	 “had	 he	known”	 highlights	 the	 interdependence	 of	 the	 two	 steps.	 It	 is	 on	 the	basis	of	 the	knowledge	of	 the	particular	circumstances	of	 the	case	and	pondering	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	 judgement	 that	 the	 judges	 can	decide	 where	 the	 text	 says	 less	 than	 what	 is	 necessary	 for	 a	 just	decision.	 Taking	 into	 account	 the	 particular	 situation	 and	 offering	 a	corresponding	interpretation	of	the	general	rule	of	decision,	the	topic	of	definition	can	serve	the	aims	of	fairness,	so	that	the	speaker	will	be	able,	once	again,	“to	make	clear	what	is	just.”	Unlike	 the	conceptual	approach	summarised	 in	 the	 first	part	of	the	paper,	 the	subsequent	 list	of	 topics	seems	 to	have	a	much	broader	scope,	which	does	not	in	every	case	fit	the	interpretive	method.	The	last	three	 topics,	 in	 particular,	 do	 not	 say	 anything	 about	 how	 the	 judges	should	decide.	Neither	the	importance	of	patience,	nor	the	opposition	of	words	and	deeds	can	be	used	as	an	argument	concerning	the	merits	of	the	 legal	 case.	 The	 remark	 attached	 to	 the	 last	 one,	where	 arbitration	and	 adjudication	 by	 the	 court	 are	 compared,	 may	 appear	 in	 an	arbitration	case	as	a	means	of	reminding	the	arbitrators	of	their	duty	to	make	a	fair	decision,	but	the	assertion	that	“it	is	fair	to	prefer	arbitration	to	adjudication”	cannot	really	contribute	 to	such	a	decision.	Therefore,	their	place	in	Aristotle’s	list	is	best	explained	if	one	does	not	read	them	as	 topics	 for	 arguments	 in	 the	 strict	 sense.	 Together	with	 some	of	 the	other	 items	of	 the	 list,	 they	seem	to	serve	as	 topics	of	characterisation	focusing	 on	 the	 ethos	 aspect	 of	 the	 speech	 rather	 than	 the	 logos	 (cf.	Harris,	 2013a,	 p.	 32).	What	 connects	 them	 to	 the	 other,	 “legal”	 topics	and	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 of	what	 is	 to	 epieikes	 in	 law	 is	 that	 they	likewise	 stem	 from	 Aristotle’s	 definition	 of	 fairness	 and	 represent	popular	beliefs	of	morality.	One	 should	not,	however,	 look	 in	 them	 for	principles	 of	 legal	 interpretation,	 nor	 can	 they	 be	 used	 to	 reconstruct	Aristotle’s	 views	 on	 the	 functioning	 of	 epieikeia	 in	 judicial	 decision-making.			ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:	A	previous	version	of	the	first	part	of	the	paper	was	presented	at	the	2nd	Central	and	Eastern	European	Forum	of	Young	Legal,	 Political	 and	 Social	 Theorists,	 Budapest	 2010.	 As	 for	 its	 more	recent	readers,	I	am	grateful	to	Edward	Harris,	George	Boys-Stones,	and	Péter	 Cserne	 for	 their	 comments	 and	 advice.	 I	 am	 also	 indebted	 to	Serena	Tomasi	for	her	stimulating	response	at	the	conference.			
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CERMEG,	School	of	International	Studies,	University	of	Trento,	Italy	
serena.tomasi_1@unitn.it			1.	INTRODUCTION			Könczöl’s	 essay	 is	 a	 critical	 study	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 fairness	 from	 a	rhetorical	perspective	in	legal	argumentation.	In	my	view,	this	paper	has	two	main	features	(which	correspond	to	the	author’s	declared	aims):	i)	a	 philological	 interest	 since	 the	 author	 presents	 an	 accurate	reconstruction	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 fairness	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 classical	sources.	The	analysis	focuses	on	Aristotle,	taking	into	account	the	most	relevant	passages	 in	the	Rhetoric	and	 in	the	Nicomachean	Ethics.	Then,	the	Aristotelian	version	of	epieikeia	is	compared	to	the	one	proposed	by	Plato	 in	 the	 Statesman.	 ii)	 A	 rhetorical	 approach:	 the	 author	 lists	 a	possible	topic	of	arguments	based	on	fairness	that	is	useful	and	used	in	judicial	speeches.	In	this	comment,	I	argue	that	these	points	should	imply	further	theoretical	 and	 methodological	 insights,	 which	 are	 relevant	 in	 the	contemporary	 developments	 of	 legal	 theory	 and	 legal	 reasoning.	 My	goal	 is	 to	 recast	 the	 outcomes	 of	 Könczöl’s	 analysis	 in	 a	 broader	dimension	 linked	 to	 the	 debate	 in	 legal	 theory,	 by	 evaluating	 the	relation	 between	 positive	 law	 and	 fairness	 in	 light	 of	 argumentation	theory	 and	 by	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 argumentative	 process	 of	fairness	in	legal	reasoning.			2.	MULTIPLE	WORDS	FOR	EPIEIKEIA		The	classical	concept	of	epieikeia	has	played	a	key	role	in	legal	systems	for	ages,	since	Roman	lawyers	were	aware	of	the	inseparability	between	
ius	 and	aequitas.	 There	 are	 different	ways	 of	 language	 translation	 and	multiple	 (seemingly)	 equivalent	 options,	 including	 equity,	 equality,	justness,	 fairness	and	reasonableness.	Regardless	the	specific	 linguistic	choice,	 in	 principle,	 each	word	 requires	 true	 fairness	 in	 opposition	 to	the	 letter	 of	 the	 law.	 Equity	 is	 what	 allows	 the	 law	 to	 be	 applied	 in	
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338	practice,	in	the	different	and	concrete	circumstances,	which	could	have	not	 been	 embodied	 in	 law.	 The	 common	 shaping	 concept	 appeals	 to	introducing	 a	 creative	 or	 corrective	 element	 for	 realizing	 a	 fair	development	of	law.	The	tension	between	the	law	and	the	case	is,	in	fact,	inescapable	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 rules	 depend	 on	 their	 further	interpretive	and	creative	concretizations.		This	 conception	 of	 fairness	 addresses	 the	 following	 questions:		what	does	it	mean	creative?	Is	it	reducible	to	the	effort	of	an	affordable	ruler?	Does	it	depend	on	the	interactions	of	the	parties	in	trial?		3.	 LEGAL	 REASONING,	 FAIRNESS	 AND	 ARGUMENTATIVE	REASONABLENESS		This	 paper	 deals	 with	 the	 fundamental	 issues	 of	 legal	 reasoning	 and	interpretation	(Canale	&	Tuzet,	2008),	within	 the	 framework	of	 theory	of	argumentation.		According	 to	 rhetorical	 tradition,	 the	 principle	 of	 fairness	implies	 a	 non-formalistic	 approach	 to	 legal	 reasoning,	 involving	 the	usage	of	arguments	from	fairness	in	legal	argumentation.	The	decision-making	process	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	formalistic	way	of	inference:	in	a	deductivistic	 framework,	 a	 legal	 provision	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 a	 major	premise,	a	statement	of	fact	is	the	minor	premise	and	the	conclusion	is	an	individualized	norm	inferred	by	law.	In	order	for	a	deductivist	model	to	work,	 it	 is	necessary	 that	both	 the	relevant	 legal	 rules	and	 the	 facts	are	undisputed,	without	problems	of	interpretation	or	proofs.	The	fact	is	that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 contain	 a	 legal	 decision	 in	 a	 legal	 deductive	syllogism	for	several	reasons.		First,	plural	sources.	Legal	pluralism	has	become	a	major	theme	in	legal	studies:	the	existence	of	legal	plurality	is	not	just	a	fact	but	has	turned	 to	 be	 an	 institutional	 value.	 The	 presence	 of	 multiple	 legal	systems	(national	and	international)	and	therefore	plural	values	in	law	has	 become	 an	 institutional	 feature	 of	 contemporary	 legal	 contexts	(Puppo,	2013).	The	selection	of	suitable	norms	and	their	interpretation	according	to	the	performing	values	is	not	an	automatic	procedure	but	a	controversial	one,	which	happens	in	trial.		Secondly,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 the	 State-nation	 is	 not	 based	anymore	 on	 one	 leader	 social	 class	 which	 could	 generate	 a	 dogmatic	policy	 of	 law	 interpretation,	 thanks	 to	 shared	 social	 interests.	 Legal	organisation	of	 society	 is	 congruent	with	 its	 social	 organisation:	 social	diversity	 implies	 different	 extra-legal	 expectations.	 As	 to	 law,	 it	 is	 as	plural	as	social	life	itself.	Third,	the	concept	of	legal	entity	has	turned	to	be	fluid	because,	accordingly	 to	what	 in	 facts	happens,	 there	 is	an	explosion	of	multiple	
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339	legal	 acts.	To	describe	 the	 state,	 it	has	been	used	 the	economical	 term	“inflation”	 describing	 a	 chaotic	 state	 of	 policymaking.	 This	 legislative	inflation	 makes	 the	 rules	 conflicting	 or	 contradictory.	 Following	 the	doctrine	 of	 principles	 by	 Dworkin,	 in	 1992,	 Gustavo	 Zagrebelsky,	 an	Italian	jurist	and	a	Constitutional	Judge,	identified	a	criterion	of	order	in	the	Constitution	Act,	considering	it	not	as	a	normative	act	but	as	a	fabric	of	 principles	 (Zagreblsky,	 1992).	 This	 scholar	 restored	 in	 Italian	Jurisprudence	 a	 new	 concept	 of	 law,	 open	 to	 values	 than	 to	 the	 strict	positive	law,	influenced	by	the	constitutional	 law.	To	his	mind,	 law	has	to	 be	mild,	 in	 declared	 opposition	 to	 the	 positivistic	 idea	 of	 strict	 law	(dura	lex	sed	lex).	The	 point	 is	 that	 mildness	 is	 not	 a	 feature	 of	 law	 itself,	 but	 it	regards	the	application	of	law.	Recalling	Opocher’s	legal	perspective,	the	core	 of	 legal	 experience	 is	 not	 positive	 law	 but	 the	 judicial	 decision-making	process	(Manzin,	2014).	In	a	narrow	sense,	interpretation	of	law	can	 be	 understood	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 argumentative	 methodologies	employed	 by	 judges	 in	 judgment:	 the	 linguistic	 interaction	 with	 the	parties,	 the	 topical	 selection	 of	 legal	 arguments,	 the	 role	 of	 the	institutional	 contexts,	 the	 interpersonal	 dimension	 of	 the	 process,	 the	uses	of	rhetoric	(Tomasi,	2012,	2015).		In	 the	 field	 of	 argumentation,	 argumentation	 theorists	 draw	insights	from	logic,	rhetoric,	communication	studies,	discourse	analysis,	stylistics.	Taking	 the	pragma-dialectical	 theory	as	a	possible	model	 for	understanding	 and	 assessing	 legal	 reasoning,	 to	 be	 considered	reasonable	 the	 exchange	 of	 thoughts	 and	 moves	 need	 to	 be	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 rules	 for	 conducting	 a	 critical	 discussion	 (van	Eemeren,	 2011).	 By	 the	 way	 of	 these	 rules,	 the	 ideal	 model	 provides	clear	 points	 of	 orientation	 for	 the	 parties	 involved:	 if	 the	 interaction	proceeds	in	an	adequate	fashion,	the	parties	will	come	to	an	acceptable	settlement	of	the	dispute.			4.	FAIR	AND	REASONABLE	TRIAL				Aristotle	 shaped	 the	 concept	 of	 fairness	 to	 the	 lesbian	 rule:	 it	 was	 a	particular	 flexible	mason's	 rule	made	of	 lead	 that	 could	be	bent	 to	 the	curves	of	a	moulding	and	used	to	measure	irregular	curves.	The	rule	is	a	metaphor	 for	 flexibility	 in	 practical	 reasoning:	 in	 the	 Nicomachean	Ethics	Aristotle	discussed	the	difficulty	of	legal	congruence	with	reality:		 For	when	the	thing	is	indefinite	the	rule	also	is	indefinite,	like	the	leaden	rule	used	in	making	the	Lesbian	moulding;	the	rule	adapts	itself	to	the	shape	of	the	stone	and	is	not	rigid,	and	so	
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340	 too	the	decree	is	adapted	to	the	facts	(Aristotle,	Nicomachean	Ethics,	bk	V,	ch.	10).		Out	 of	 metaphors,	 fairness	 consists	 in	 a	 fair	 trail	 in	 which	 the	interpretation	of	the	legal	provision	is	argued	by	the	parties	and,	finally,	by	the	judge.	Before	an	impartial	judge,	parties	must	set	their	positions,	demonstrate	 the	 soundness	 and	 the	 coherence,	 resist	 to	 objections,	persuade	each	other’s.	Claiming	trial,	conflicting	parties	make	a	shared	decision	 about	 their	 conflict	 by	 communicating	 about	 their	 different	standpoints,	trying	to	understand	each	other’s	reasons	and	arguing	each	other	 in	 an	 institutionalized	 framework.	 The	 third	 party,	 without	expressing	 a	 personal	 option,	would	 play	 a	mediating	 role	 to	 help	 the	parties	 to	 solve	 the	 conflict	 in	 a	 reasonable	 way,	 favoring	 the	 setting	(Greco	 Morasso,	 2011).	 During	 the	 communicative	 interaction,	 if	 the	parties	 pursue	 the	 same	 goal	 towards	 a	 reasonable	 solution	 of	 the	problem,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 debate	 the	 parties	 should	 show	 mutual	understanding	and	respect	the	final	decision.	To	my	mind,	 the	 argumentative	 account	 squares	perfectly	well	with	 the	 classical	 concept	 of	 fairness	 reconstructed	 by	 the	 Author,	demanding	 for	 the	 application	 in	 the	 legal	 context	 of	 argumentative	techniques	for	analysis	and	evaluation	of	arguments	(Feteris,	1999).			REFERENCES		Aristotle	(Ross,	W.D.	trans.)	(1908).	The	Nichomachean	Ethics.	Oxford:	Claredon	Press.	Canale,	 D.,	 &	 Tuzet,	 G.	 (2008),	 Interpretation	 and	 legal	 theory:	 a	 debate.	 In	
Analisi	e	diritto	2007	(pp.	123-207).	Torino:	Giappichelli.	Eemeren,	F.H.,	 van.	 (2011).	 In	alle	 redelijkheid.	 In	 reasonableness.	Amsterdam:	Rozenberg.	Feteris,	E.T.	 (1999).	Fundamentals	of	 legal	argumentation:	A	survey	of	 theories	
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